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By Dr. C. 0. Okidi*

Review of Treaties on Consumptive
Utilization of Waters of Lake Victoria

and Nile Drainage System
INTRODUCTION
The Nile River and Lake Victoria together constitute one of the
world's largest fresh water basins. Lake Victoria is the second largest
fresh water lake in the world, after Lake Superior, with the longest
shoreline of any lake. The Nile is the second longest river, after the
Mississippi. Besides Egypt, there are eight other coriparians of the
Victoria and Nile: Sudan, Ethiopia, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania,
Rwanda, and Burundi. 1 One estimate suggests that the whole catchment area totals 2,900,000 square kilometers, which represents onetenth of the total area of that continent. 2
All of the states sharing the Nile and Victoria basins have achieved
political independence since 1960, yet there have been no agreements
concluded since that time on the uses of the Nile. The years 1959 and
1960 saw one agreement and protocol, respectively, between Egypt
and Sudan for utilization of the Nile waters.' Before the 1959 Agreement, there were about a dozen agreements focusing on the White
Nile and the Egyptian interest. 4 Since 1960, the range of uses to
which the water is put presumably have increased and there may be
many plans under consideration for still wider water usage, so that
the safeguards in the pre-1960 treaties will prove inadequate, irrelevant, or contrary to present exigencies of development. Therefore,
* Senior Research Fellow, University of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies.

1. Ongweny, Water Resources of Lake Victoria Drainage Basin in Kenya, NATIONAL
RESOURCES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAKE VICTORIA BASIN OF KENYA 6884 (C. 0. Okidi, ed., 1979) (Univ. of Nairobi IDS/OP No. 34) [hereinafter Ongweni].
2. Caponera, The Nile River Basin: Legal and Technical Aspects, mimeo paper of August 1958 being an English translation of an Italian version, /7 Bachino Internationale del Nilo
Consideration Giuridishe in XIV LA COMUNITE INTERNATIONALE 45-66 (Jan. 1959)
[hereinafter Caponeral.
3. That was within two years after Sudan became independent. The Agreement on the
Full Utilization of the Nile Waters was signed by Sudan and Egypt at Cairo on 8 Nov. 1959.
It was the Protocol Concerning the Establishment of the Permanent Joint Technical Committee for the implementation of that Agreement which was signed by the two States at
Cairo on 17 Jan. 1960. See text in United Nations Legislative Series, LEGISLATIVE TEXTS
AND TREATY PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS FOR OTHER PURPOSES THAN NAVIGATION 143-49, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/12 (1963).
4. See Section III, this article.
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the Nile and Victoria system coriparians might have been expected to
engage in widespread and detailed scholarly and policy studies regarding the use of those shared waters whose legal regime is now subject
to serious debate inside and outside of the United Nations.
Geographically, the Nile forms a belt that could transmit and promote elements of cooperation between the Arab states in northern
Africa and the Black African states south of the Sahara, but in this
region the relationships which have prevailed are largely those dictated by the legacy of colonialism. These relationships need to change
and in fact are changing; it is to be expected that the pattern of
change in the relationship that is linked to the use of the waters of
the Nile Basin is changing, as well. Are there any changes that can be
discerned by analyzing the legal instruments for cooperation in the
use of the Nile waters?
This paper intends to analyze the range of instruments that have
been signed in an attempt to create cooperation in the consumptive
uses of the waters of the Nile Basin; the adequacy of existing treaties
to cope with the full range of possible and actual uses of those waters;
and some recent developments in terms of actual or planned projects
in the basin states which indicate an urgent need for an up-to-date
framework for dealing with Nile and Lake Victoria waters.
I. GEOGRAPHICAL AND TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVES
Lake Victoria sits on the eastern African plateau at an elevation of
900 meters, surrounded by relatively low-lying land averaging 1,100
meters around its shores.' Total area of the lake is approximately
68,800 square kilometers, of which the Kenyan share is about 10%,
Ugandan, 40%, and Tanzanian, 50%.6 Surface water contributed by
rivers comes entirely from Kenya (the Kuja, Awach or Kibuon, Miriu
or Sondu, Nyando, Yala, Nzoia, and Sio) on the eastern side, and
Tanzania (the Mara, which crosses into Kenya, and the Kagera) on
the southern side, respectively. 7 The Kagera River is significant because it drains the territories of Rwanda and Burundi as well, a fact
that has made it a subject of a special international basin commission
comprising the three governments, 8 and also because it extends the
limits of the Nile Basin farther to the southwest.
5. Ongweny, supra note 1.
6. Kongere, Production and Socio-economic Aspects of Fisheries in the Lake Victoria
Drainage Basin in Kenya, in NATIONAL RESOURCES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LAKE VICTORIA BASIN OF KENYA 407, 410 (C. 0. Okidi ed., 1979) (Univ. of Nairobi
IDS/OP No. 34) [hereinafter Kongere I .
7. Ongweny, supra note 1.
8. The treaty between Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda which was signed in 1977 will be
discussed later. See report in The Standard (Nairobi), Nov. 1977, at 4 and The Standard
(Nairobi), Oct. 17, 1978, at 8.
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Linked to the lake in Uganda is the Nile, which is the only drainage
outlet from Lake Victoria. Here, at the Ugandan industrial town of
Jinja, the exit discharge passes through the Owen Falls Dam, commissioned in 19549 to provide long-term storage of water for Egypt
and to produce hydroelectric power for Uganda. After construction
of the dam, reliable estimates of the exit discharge from Lake Victoria
have indicated releases through the turbines which generate electricity
and releases through the sluices total a discharge downstream conforming to the "natural regime of the river at Jinja."'" This is the
way the system is supposed to work, and the term natural regime
here means the same rate at which water flowed out of Lake Victoria
before the dam was built. This issue will be examined later.
The Victoria stretch of the Nile flows from Jinja to Lake Kyoga;
between Lake Kyoga and Lake Mobutu Sese Seko (formerly Lake Albert), it is the Kyoga Nile. It exits from this lake on the northern toe
as the Albert Nile, and is the only outlet from that lake. It is at Lake
Albert (Mobutu) that Zaire, as a basin state of the Nile, makes its contact through the River Semiliki which, flowing from Zaire, enters the
lake at its southern toe. From Mobutu to Malakal in Sudan, the river
is known as Bar el Jebel, part of the White Nile." This is the area of
the well known Sudds of Southern Sudan, where much water is lost
through evaporation and soakage; 2 it is this loss of water that instigated construction of the Jonglei Canal which will be discussed in the
final section of this paper. Beyond Malakal, the White Nile flows directly northwards up to Khartoum where it is joined by the Blue Nile,
which drains Lake Tsana in the Ethiopian highlands. Then farther
north it is again joined by the Atbara, flowing from the Eritrean highlands. It makes one gentle loop southward, then northward, crossing
the border at Wadi Halfa into Egypt, where it is ushered gently to its
delta on the Mediterranean. There, the Nile completes its full length,
estimated at about 4,180 miles from the Jinja exit."
9. The agreement for the construction of Owen Falls Dam was reached through exchange
of Notes between Britain, the colonial administrators of Uganda, and Egypt. Construction
started in May 1949.
10. Report of the Hydrometeorological Survey of the Catchments of Lakes Victoria,
Kyoga, and Albert (Burundi, Egypt, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania,
and Uganda) 1 METEOROLOGY AND HYDROLOGY OF THE BASIN PART 11578 (1974)
(UNDP and WMO, RAL 66-025 Tech. Report No. 1) [hereinafter Hydrometeorological Survey].
11. See TIMES ATLAS OF THE WORLD: COMPREHENSIVE EDITION, Plates 86 and
87 (1975).
12. Garretson, The Nile Basin, in GARRETSON, HAYTON, and OLMSTEAD, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 256, 258 (1967) [hereinafter Garretson]. According to Garretson, of the 24 milliards of water that flow downstream from Lake
Albert (Mobutu Sese Seko) and the East African highlands, 12 million are lost by evaporation and soakage in the Sudd area of southern Sudan.
13. Id. at 256.
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For purposes of international legal and policy perspectives of the
Nile basin, there are further geographical-hydrological facts that
should be examined. The volume of water each of the riparians contributes to the Nile might be taken into account in the decision of
how much water a riparian might properly divert for its national use.
In terms of proportions, Gamal Moursi Bard of Egypt estimates that,
of the total annual Nile discharge, 84% is contributed by Ethiopia
and only 16% comes "from the Lake Plateau of Central Africa."''
Garretson, however, offers the estimate that at the peak of its flood
(April-September), the Blue Nile alone supplies 90% of the water
passing through Khartoum, but that in the low season (January-March)
it provides only 20%.11 A broad estimate would be that the Lake
Plateau of Central Africa contributes between 20 and 25% of the
water flowing north of Khartoum, while 75 to 80% is contributed by
Ethiopia.
To Egypt, a lower riparian dependent on Nile waters for its survival,
the contribution from Lake Victoria on an annual basis must be
minute, compared to that for Ethiopia. However, the Lake Plateau
water supply is reliably steady throughout the year because of the
storage at Owen Falls Dam. One commentator has noted that it was
because of the annual flooding, due to the Ethiopian contribution,
that Egypt decided to construct the High Dam at Aswan to regulate
the flow and provide over-year storage for Egypt, rather than depend
on the remote reservoirs of Lake Tsana and the Central African lakes. 6
The source points out as well that Sudan has preferred regulation of
the flow of Nile waters by a series of smaller dams rather than the
Aswan model which would, in any case, only assure steady supply to
Egypt, and not to Sudan, and also where the reservoir would extend
into Sudan to flood the town of Wadi Halfa. 1 7 Besides the flow control, the dam was to be used for generation of 10,000,000 KWH of
hydroelectric power. Egyptian interests prevailed, and the dam was
constructed between 1961-64. The degree of regulation of flow to
meet year-round irrigation needs which has been accomplished in fact
14. Bard, The Nile Waters Question: Background and Recent Developments, 15 REVUE
EGYPTIENE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 2 (1959). This nearly agrees with the figure
given by Ethiopia as 85%. See The Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa) May 21, 1978. That is
to say, the total contribution to the Nile anywhere south of Sobat (by Uganda, Zaire, Kenya,
Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda) would be 16%.
15. Garretson, supra note 12, at 259.
16. Batstone, The Utilization of the Nile Waters, 8 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 523-25 (July
1959) [hereinafter Batstone].
17. Id.
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by the Aswan Dam needs to be ascertained, because it may have a
bearing on Egypt's dependence on the waters of Central African lakes
at present. Also, the volume flowing out of Ethiopia is highly susceptible to variation, depending on that nation's plan for future development.
The Sudan contributes no water to the Nile and in addition to
what it consumes for irrigation, there is volume lost in the Sudd zone.
Apart from precipitation, only the southern and eastern parts of the
Lake Victoria basin contribute to the waters of the lake.' 8 The lake's
contribution to the Nile is easily determined by measuring the total
discharge at Owen Falls Dam. For purposes of policy in Kenya and
Tanzania, the exact proportion of the annual outflow at Owen Falls
which is contributed by each country, separately, needs to be established. This line of analysis should use percentage of volume contributed rather than absolute quantity or volume, because when an upper
riparian diverts water from an international basin flowing through its
territory, the fear of deprivation or injury expressed by a lower riparian is clearest when expressed in terms of proportions.1 9
The final question to be considered here is whether the Lake Victoria and River Nile systems constitute one basin. A drainage basin
has been defined as "The entire area, known as the watershed, that
contributes water, both surface and underground, to the principal
river, stream or lake or other common terminus. '"20 While the Nile
and its tributaries flow directly into the Mediterranean Sea, Lake
Victoria drains directly into the Nile, thus contributing water to that
one terminus. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the Lake
Victoria basin and the Nile basin constitute one drainage system with
two subparts. Regulation of flow through Owen Falls makes for some
semiautonomy for Lake Victoria's basin which could be managed as
a subpart, but it can be argued that hydrologically, a basin may be
dammed where it is most convenient. This may explain why the
countries around Lake Victoria, especially Kenya and Tanzania,
might have unique clusters of interests in the lake which could be
poised against those of the lower riparians, Sudan and Egypt, in any
attempt to work out an up-to-date legal regime for the Victoria and
Nile waters.

18. Ongweny, supra note 1.
19. Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in GARRETSON, HAYTON, and OLMSTEAD, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 18-40 (1967).
20. The Helsinki Rules, Report of the Fifty Second Conference, Helsinki, 1966, at 486.
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II. AGREEMENTS ON THE NILE AND LAKE VICTORIA WATERS

Introduction
We shall limit ourselves to arguments dealing with consumptive use
only, omitting those on navigational uses, as well as demarcation of
boundaries and spheres of influence.2 1
Certainly one of the foremost considerations of the treaties on the
Nile waters is that Egypt, as a desert state and lowest riparian of the
Nile, would be a party to each of the treaties, especially those dealing
with consumptive use of the waters, while all the upper basin states
would be involved in the different stages. But the pattern does not
reflect that. There are about ten agreements dealing with consumptive
use of the waters of the Nile and Lake Victoria. Prior to World War I,
the treaties show Great Britain, rather than Egypt, as the contracting
State. The United Kingdom, then the administering colonial power
over Sudan, signed an agreement with Italy (1891),22 Ethiopia
(1902),23

the Independent State of the Congo (1906),24 and with

Italy and France (1906).25 There is a further agreement with Italy,
signed by Britain, in 1925.26 Since then, Britain and Egypt signed all
agreements on the Nile waters beginning with the 1929 agreement
dealing with Egyptian rights generally, vis a vis those of the Sudan, 2 7
to the agreements for construction and maintenance of the Owen
Falls Dam done by exchange of Notes between 1949 and 1953.28
The year 1953 is historically significant as the time when Egypt
was proclaimed a Republic, and Nasser emerged as the real power,
bringing about a change in relations with Britain even though the de
facto break did not come until the Suez crisis of 1956. Sudan also
became independent in 1956. It was after that time that the fourth
and final set of agreements was signed on the Nile waters-Egypt and
the Sudan signed an agreement on the utilization of the Nile waters
21. This author's research indicates that the first ever "agreement" on the Nile dealt
with navigational uses of the river. It was expressed in the form of a unilateral declaration
issued by the Viceroy of Egypt, under the Ottoman Empire, on October 13, 1841, granting
to foreigners the privilege of building ships for navigation on the Nile. See SYSTEMATIC
INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES TREATIES, DECLARATIONS,
ACTS AND CASES BY BASINS, 45, 129, 135, 137, 146-7, 157-61 (1978) (FAO Legis.
Study No. 15).
22. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 127-28.
23. HERTSLET, THE MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY, VOL. 11, NO. 100, 432-42 (3d
ed. 1967) [hereinafter HERTSLET].
24. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 99.
25. HERTSLET, THE MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY, VOL. II, NO. 165,584-85 (3d
ed. 1967).
26. 50 L.N.T.S. 282 (1926).
27. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 100-107.
28. Id. at 108-115.
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in 1959,29 and followed it with a protocol establishing a joint technical committee in 1960.30
Pre-World War IAgreements
Italy and the United Kingdom (UK) signed a Protocol for the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence in eastern Africa at
Rome on April 15, 1891. Of interest is a provision in Article III that
stipulated that "The Government of Italy undertakes not to construct
on the Atbara any irrigation or other works which might sensibly
modify its flow into the Nile. '" 31 The agreement, by its very nature,
died with Italian and British colonial rule in the region.
Ethiopia and the UK signed a treaty at Addis Ababa on May 15,
1902, regarding the frontiers between Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Article III provided:
His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II, King of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile,
Lake Tsana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters
into the Nile except in agreement with his Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Sudan. 3 2
The view of the present government in Ethiopia towards agreements
signed by the imperial government is not clear, but it would be expected that their binding force cannot be taken for granted. Dante
Caponera once observed that Ethiopia questioned the validity of the
agreements for the following reasons:
1. The agreements . . .between Ethiopia and the UK have never
been ratified. Customary rights which might appear from the behaviour between lower riparians and Ethiopia would not be binding on the latter country if a purely positivistic approach toward
interpretation of the sources of international law would be upheld.
2. Ethiopia's "natural rights" in a certain share of the waters in its
own territory are undeniable and unquestionable. However, no
treaty has ever mentioned them. This fact would be sufficient for
invalidating the binding force of these agreements, which have no
counterpart in favour of Ethiopia. .

.

.In Roman law such a

pact would be null and void; it is likewise in international law.
This is explainable by the international political conditions of
Ethiopia in 1902.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 143-48.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 127-28.
HERTSLET, supra note 23, at 432-42.
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3. The agreements were signed between Ethiopia and the UK (for

Egypt and the Sudan). Since the latter question the validity of
their own water agreements . . . Ethiopia, which had not one

single benefit from them, had even greater reason for the claiming
of their unfairness and invalidity. The research for new agreements
by Egypt and Sudan demonstrates the nonviability of these agreements.
4. The UK in 1935 recognized the annexation of Ethiopian Empire
by Italy

. .

. UK's recognition of annexation is an act which in-

validated all previous agreements between the two governments.
Ethiopia has never asked for renewal of the Nile agreements after
such recognition. 3 3
The points listed here are important because they underscore the fact
that Ethiopia did not, in the 1950s, recognize the treaty as binding.
Whether the arguments are persuasive is a different matter. For example, there is nothing in international law which prevents any state
from entering into a treaty which benefits only one of the parties.
An extension of this point would perhaps include treaties which extend rights to third parties. 3 4 On the other hand, the argument about
British recognition of the Ethiopian annexation might be the most
forceful, although the legal consequences of hostilities or war are not
entirely clear-cut. 3" It should be noted that since the 1902 treaty
there has not been any agreement between the lower riparians, Sudan
and Egypt, and Ethiopia. Egypt and the UK or Sudan have signed
other agreements since 1929, but in no instance was Ethiopia a party,
even though 80% of the Nile waters reaching Egypt originate in Ethiopia.
The UK and the Independent State of the Congo signed an agreement at London on May 9, 1906, to redefine their spheres of influence in Central Africa. 3 6 Article III provided:
The Government of the Independent State of the Congo undertakes
not to construct, or to allow to be constructed, any work on or near
the Semiliki or Isango Rivers, which would diminish the volume of
water entering Lake Albert, except in agreement with the Sudanese
Government.
Again, we can assume that this one died with the end of the colonial
era; it has significance only as an indicator of how far back the interests of Sudan and Egypt in Nile Basin waters have been protected.
33. Caponera, supra note 2, at 13-14.
34. See Articles 36 and 37 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).
35. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 595-96 (2d
ed. 1973) and MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 695-728 (1961).
36. See relevant articles in U.N. Doc. ST/L/G/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 99.
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Great Britain, France, and Italy signed one set of tripartite Agreement and Declarations in London on December 13, 1906." 7 This
agreement and declarations came after Italy had failed to establish
control over Ethiopia, and was a reconfirmation of the terms of the
Protocol of April 1891 and the Agreement of May 1902. In the tripartite agreement, at the insistence of Great Britain, Article IV provided:
In the event of the status quo being disturbed, France, Great Britain,
and Italy shall make every effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia. In any case, they shall concert together on the basis of the agreements enumerated (herein) in order to safeguard:
(a) The interests of Great Britain and Egypt in the Nile Basin,
more especially as regards the regulation of the waters of that river
and its tributaries (due consideration being paid to the local interests ... )

'8

This was reiterated in the 1925 agreement between Great Britain and
Italy, but neither agreement had validity beyond the colonial era.
In an agreement by exchange of Notes, in December 1925 at
Rome, 3 9 the imperialist powers were to agree on how they, as well as
Sudan and Egypt, would use their influence to benefit from the Ethiopia highlands. The full gist of the pre-negotiation agreement is captured in the following paragraph of a December 14th Note from Britain:
In the event of His Majesty's Government with the valued assistance
of the Italian Government, obtaining from the Abysinnian Government the desired concession on Lake Tsana, they are also prepared
to recognize an exclusive economic influence in the West of Abysinnia and in the whole of the territory to be acrossed by the abovementioned railway. They would further promise to support with the
Abyssinnian Government all Italian requests for economic concessions in the above zone. But such recognition and undertaking are
subject to the proviso that the Italian Government on their side, rec37. HERTSLET, supra note 23, at 436, 442.
38. Id.
39. 50 L.N.T.S. 282 (1926). In this exchange, the first letter (Dec. 14, 1925) from Britain stated, inter alia, "I have therefore the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to request your Excellency's support and
assistance at Addis Ababa with the Abyssinian Government in order to obtain from them a
concession for his Majesty's Government to construct a barrage at Lake Tsana, together with
the right to construct and maintain a motor for the passage of stores, personnel, etc. from
the frontier of the Sudan to the barrage" (at 284). The Note added a quid pro quo: "His
Majesty's Government in turn are prepared to support the Italian Government in obtaining
from the Abyssinian Government a concession to construct and run a railway from the frontier of Eritrea to the frontier of Italian Somaliland" (at 285).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

ognizing the prior hydraulic rights of Egypt and Sudan, will engage
not to construct on the headwaters of the Blue or White Niles or
their tributaries or effluents any work which might sensibly modify
their flow into the river. .. .
In a note dated December 20, 192541 Italy accepted the foregoing

stipulations as an accurate outline of what the two countries had
agreed upon as their common position in the anticipated negotiations
with Ethiopia. It is obvious that the 1925 Agreement could not have
been intended to be binding on Ethiopia. Therefore, simply to list it
with other instruments on the Nile without pointing out its proper
background and substance 42 might give the impression that the agreement had a legal effect on Ethiopia; it did not.
Post-World War IAgreements
The first important post-war agreement on the Nile waters was
done in 1929 by Egypt and the UK (acting for the Sudan and its Eastern African dependencies), based on two Commission studies initiated
by Egypt which formed a background for the agreements.4 3 For the
purposes of this study, it is sufficient to begin in 1920, when the Egyptian Minister of Public Works issued a report on the scheme for control and use of the Nile waters. 4 4 That report, which suggested five
dams and a reservoir on the Nile, was criticized strongly and finally
rejected by the Egyptian government in favor of one dam at Aswan.
The Egyptian government appointed a Nile Project Commission that
same year, "to give its opinion on the projects with a view to further
the regulation of the annual supply to the benefit of Egypt and
Sudan . . ." and to report on the propriety of the manner in which

the increased supply of available water would be allocated at each
stage of development for Egypt and Sudan. 45 These terms of reference indicate that Egypt was concerned about interests of the Sudan,
but did not seek any way of cooperating with Ethiopia or the central
African states within the upper basin, including the area around Lake
Victoria.
The Commission's report stated that Egypt's rights were limited to
a supply "of water sufficient to irrigate an area equal to the largest
area which had been irrigated in any single year since the Aswan Dam
in its present form was completed, and that Egypt has an established
40. Id. at 285.

41. Id. at 291.
42. See discussions by Garretson, supra note 12, at 277-8, and Caponera, supra note 2,
at 10-11.
43. Garretson, supra note 12, at 264 et seq.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 268.
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claim to receive this water at the particular seasons when it is required." 4 6 They added further that the largest area to which Egypt
might thus claim would be 5 milliard feddans, which was under cultivation in 1916-17." 7 This paper will later question what is meant
by the "historic" water rights of Egypt. There was no agreement
within the Egyptian government regarding the merit of the report,
and the resolution was left tied to the political future of Sudan. However, when the British Governor General of the Sudan was assassinated
in Cairo in 1924, the British government in Sudan threatened to increase irrigation uses of water in that country. 48 As a result, Egypt
sought a fresh study for which the new Nile Waters Commission was
set up in January 1925. 4 9 The Commission consisted of a Dutch engineer as an independent chairman, one British, and one Egyptian
member. Their recommendation provided the basis of the 1929 Nile
Waters Agreement and was, in fact, annexed to that agreement.5 0
The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement was done by an exchange of
Notes between Mohamed Mohmoud Pasha, President of the Egyptian
Council of Ministers, and Lord Lloyd, British High Commissioner in
Cairo, on May 7, 1929 and came into force the same day.5 ' The Egyptian government pointed out that, while conceding and entering into
an agreement with Britain on utilization of Nile waters before political settlement was reached on the future of Sudan, Egypt reserved
the right to renegotiate the issue at the time of consideration of the
future of the Sudan. 2 In the first paragraph Egypt made it clear, as
a matter of principle, that the 1929 agreement was to be temporary,
and its terms viewed as conditional on future political developments.
This point is restated emphatically in the last paragraph of Pasha's
Note where he wrote:
5. The present agreement can in no way be considered as affecting
the control of the river which is reserved for free discussion between the two Governments in the negotiations on the question
of the Sudan!5 3
The statement is important as it is the only point in the agreement
46. Id.
47. Quoted in Garretson, supra note 12, at 268. There were three members of the Commission: a nominee of the Indian Government (Chairman), a nominee from Cambridge University, and a nominee of the U.S. Government. The American nominee, H. T. Cory, submitted a separate report.
48. Batstone, supra note 16, at 540.
49. Garretson, supra note 12, at 264 et seq.
50. Id.
51. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SET.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 100-07.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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which indicates the duration that the agreement was to remain in
force.
Pasha submitted, secondly, that:
2. It is realized that the development of the Sudan requires a quantity of water greater than that which has so far been utilized by
the Sudan. As your Excellency is aware, the Egyptian Government has always been anxious to encourage such development
and will therefore continue that policy and be willing to agree
with His Majesty's Government upon such an increase of this
quantity as does not infringe Egypt's natural and historical rights
in the waters of the Nile and its requirements of agricultural extension . . .

Some authors"5 read emphasis into the reference to Egypt's "natural
and historic rights" phrase; this writer believes the significance of the
paragraph is that Egypt recognized Sudanese rights to develop, and
to use the Nile waters for that purpose. That is a significant departure from the position taken before the 1925 Commission, which had
been rejected as a negation of the right of Sudan to exist as a visible
State. To the extent that Egypt accepted the right of Sudan to an increasing quantity of water for its development, Egypt also had accepted that the rights to use varying quantities of water would depend on the needs of the moment of negotiation. This interpretation
seems to be supported by the fact that when the 1920 Commission
was faced with the question of how much water Egypt was entitled
to, it simply suggested that Egypt must claim the quantity necessary
to irrigate the 5 milliard feddans under cultivation in 1916-17. 6 There
was no "natural" figure discernable in history.
The principle of prior appropriation which one commentator has
suggested 7 as an ideal interpretation of historic rights is not really
helpful. Prior appropriation would refer only to the precise quantity
that had been appropriated, and no more. Changing circumstances
would be negotiated for separately and according to what was equitable and reasonable at the time. Similarly, if for any reason additional quantities of water were available, i.e., by draining the Sudds
in southern Sudan, then the division of that new quantity would be
negotiated separately.
Egypt did not object to use of the Nile waters for construction or
irrigation in the Sudan, but did insist on prior consultation and ex54. Id.
55. Batstone, supra note 16, at 529, Garretson, supra note 12, at 284, and Bard, supra
note 14, at 4.
56. Garretson, supra note 12, at 268, and Caponcra, supra note 2, at 10-11.
57. Batstone, supra note 16, at 540.
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plicit agreement on what such construction would entail. Thus, Pasha
added in paragraph 4(b) of his Note to Lloyd that:
Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government no
irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken
on the River Nile and its branches, or on the lakes from which it
flows, so far as these are in the Sudan or in countries under British
administration, which would, in such a manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt either reduce the quantity of water
arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level. 8
It seems clear that the two countries, Egypt and Sudan, would have
to agree before Sudan could abstract the water of the Nile to an extent that would change the quantity of the water flowing to Egypt.
Sub-paragraph 4(c) of Pasha's note stated that Egypt would carry out
a complete study of the hydrology of the Nile in the Sudan, and that
Sudan would provide all necessary facilities and access.5 9 In this regard, Sudan permitted Egypt to construct and maintain, in Sudanese
territory, any structures it might need for study of the hydrology of
the river. In the event of any dispute arising on the interpretation
and application of the agreement, the parties would in good faith
seek a mutually acceptable solution. If that failed, the matter would
be referred to "an independent body with a view to arbitration," as
stated in paragraph 4(f).6" The response from Lord Lloyd 61 confirmed the accuracy of Pasha's letter, as a reflection of the agreement
they had reached, and assured that the agreement was directed toward regulation of irrigation arrangements of the Nile and had no
bearing on the status quo in the Sudan.
In summary, Egypt had overwhelming rights in the utilization of
the Nile waters; the quantity of water to which Egypt was entitled
was not specified; and the agreement did not have a specific duration.
After Sudan became independent in 1956, the two countries signed
an agreement in 1959 for the Full Utilization of Nile Waters, 62 which
was followed by a protocol for its implementation in 1960.63
What is the current status of the 1929 agreement vis-a-vis the
former British dependencies referred to in paragraph 4(b) of Pasha's
note? Because the occasion did not arise, the agreement was never invoked nor applied in Kenya or Tanzania to restrain any irrigation or
58. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 100-07.

59. Id.
60.
61.
note 3,
62.
63.

Id. Note from Pasha to Lloyd, para. 4(f).
Text of Lloyd's Note is reprinted in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B112 (1963), supra
at 107.
Id. at 143-48.
Id. at 148-49.
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other consumptive uses of water; in Uganda one could cite the Owen
Falls Dam as the type of installation envisaged in 1929. With regard
to Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, the newly independent Tanganyika
government took the view that an inherited agreement that purported
to bind Tanganyika for all time to secure consent of the Egyptian
government before it undertook irrigation, power works, or similar
measures on Lake Victoria or its catchment area, was clearly incompatible with Tanganyika's status as an independent sovereign state.6 4
On July 4, 1962, its government addressed identical Notes to the governments of Britain, Egypt, and Sudan outlining the policy of Tanganyika on the use of the waters of the Nile, and the Note was sent
to the governments of Kenya and Uganda. That Note, consistent
with Nyerere Doctrine on State succession to treaties, read in full:
The Government of Tanganyika, conscious of the vital importance
of Lake Victoria and its catchment area to the future needs and interests of the people of Tanganyika, has given the most serious consideration to the situation that arises from the emergence of Tanganyika as an independent sovereign State in relation to the provision of
the Nile Waters Agreement on the use of the waters of the Nile entered into in 1929 by means of an exchange of Notes between the
Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom.
As the result of such considerations, the Government of Tanganyika
has come to the conclusion that the provisions of the 1929 Agreement purporting to apply to the countries "under British Administration" are not binding on Tanganyika. At the same time, however,
and recognizing the importance of the waters of the Nile that have
their source in Lake Victoria to the Government and peoples of all
the riparian States, the Government of Tanganyika is willing to enter
into discussions with other interested Governments at the appropriate
time, with a view to formulating and agreeing on measures for the
regulation and division of the waters in a manner that is just and
equitable to all riparian States and of the greatest benefit to all their
Peoples.
In the meantime the Government of Tanganyika for its part attaches
considerable importance to a continuation of the present arrangements whereby technical experts from the United Arab Republic,
the Sudan and the Three East African countries of Tanganyika,
Kenya, and Uganda meet at intervals to discuss common technical
problems connected with the use of the waters of the Nile. 6 s
Tanzania maintained further that, since the 1929 Agreement applied
64. SEATON & MALITI, TANZANIA TREATY PRACTICE 90-91 (1963) [hereinafter
SEATON & MALITI].
65. Id.
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to territories under British administration, the treaty lapsed, in relation to Tanganyika, on Independence Day.
On November 21, 1963, Egypt, in a Note replying to Tanganyika,
simply submitted that "pending further agreement, the 1929 Nile
Waters Agreement . . . remained -valid and applicable." 6 6

They

added that they were in favor of the continuation of the unofficial
talks between technical experts from Egypt and Sudan on the one
hand, and Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda on the other.6 7 The Note
was sent to Sudan, 6" which made no reply to either communication.
Tanganyika's Ministry of Foreign Affairs held the view that the
1929 Nile Waters Agreement was neither a real nor a dispositive
agreement and, therefore, had no legal effect on an independent Tanganyika, and, of course, on Tanzania.6 9
Kenya did not respond to the Note from Tanganyika, or the response of Egypt, which was understandable as the British government
had not yet left Kenya. They could have found it convenient to remain silent and leave it to an independent Kenya to sort matters out.
Kenya did, upon independence, adopt a position similar to the
Nyerere Doctrine of succession to treaties, submitting that the Government of Kenya was willing to grant two years grace period in which
the treaties would apply on the basis of reciprocity, or modified by
mutual consent.70 But those treaties which were not so modified or
negotiated within the two years and "which cannot be regarded as
surviving according to the rules of customary international law will
be regarded as having terminated." 7 1 This would indicate that the
treaty ceased to have effect with respect to Kenya as from December
12, 1965.
The same facts applying to Kenya would apply to Uganda, particularly the position relative to succession to treaties as expressed in the
Independence Declaration on Treaties wherein Uganda adopted the
Nyerere Doctrine.7
The position of Sudan would have a bearing on that of Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda, since Sudan was more directly involved in the
treaty. At the time of Sudanese independence in 1956, Sudan declared that it "was not bound to take over an Agreement to which it
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 90.
70. SEATON & MALITI, supra note 64, at 148-49 (Kenya Independence Declaration on
Treaties).
71. Id.
72. SEATON & MALITI, supra note 64, Appendix V.
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was not a party and which was, anyway, considered unfair; ' 7 3 stated
outright that the 1929 Agreement was obsolete; and prepared to negotiate a new one. 7 4 There is no reason why the three East African
countries only remotely referred to in the treaty should be expected
to have remained bound.
Finally, Egypt's position with regard to the preconditions to the
Agreement is the cue to the life of the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement.
As pointed out earlier, 75 Egypt considered the 1929 Agreement temporary pending determination of the political future of the Sudan. If
it was temporary for Egypt and Sudan, there is no reason it should
have longer life for Kenya, Tanzania, or Uganda.
The Owen Falls Dam Agreements
Attempts by Great Britain to secure on behalf of Egypt and Sudan
an agreement with upper riparians, especially Ethiopia, to construct
major storage has been evidenced in the foregoing. A focus on Ethiopia probably was due to the fact that over 80% of the Nile waters
reaching Egypt originate in Ethiopia. However, the upper reaches of
the White Nile were not entirely ignored. In 1946 the Ministry of
Public Works drew up a comprehensive plan where the main components were: a dam at the Great Lakes of Equatorial Africa; construction of the Jonglei Canal in Sudan; the Lake Tsana Reservoir; and a
dam at Merowe near the fourth cataract on the Nile.7 6
It was necessary to find a suitable site for construction of what H.
E. Hurst, Controller of the Physical Department of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works called "Century Storage" of water.7 7 In the
first proposal, the dam in the Great Lakes was to be constructed at
the outlet from Lake Albert with only a small regulating dam on
Lake Victoria. But for Lake Albert (5,300 square kilometers 78 ) to
store the required capacity of 155 milliard cubic feet of water, would
flood a considerable area around it, most of which lay in the territory
of Uganda and the Belgian Congo. The governments in Uganda and
the Belgian Congo objected very strongly because the flooding would
displace the population and cause a loss of valuable land under cultivation in a large area along the Victoria Nile.
So Egypt advanced an alternate proposal for a dam at the outlet of
73. Bard, supra note 14.
74. MUTITI, STATE SUCCESSION TO TREATIES IN RESPECT OF NEWLY INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES 23 (1976) [hereinafter MUTITI].
75. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 100-107.
76. MUTITI, supra note 74.
77. H. HURST, THE NILE: A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE RIVER AND THE UTILIZATION OF ITS WATERS 301 (1952) [hereinafter HURST].
78. Id.

January 1982]

REVIEW OF TREATIES

Lake Victoria. The advantages of this site over Lake Albert were considered to be enormous: more water would be stored than in the original plan, since Lake Victoria has a total area of 68,000 square kilometers. It was estimated that the average depth of the lake was 40
meters, with a maximum of 70 meters.7 9 Britain, the administering
power over the three states around Lake Victoria, was not opposed
to the level of the lake rising by a maximum of 1.3 meters, or about
4 feet.80 The consequence of this rise was recounted by Hurst:
The rising level of Lake Victoria will necessitate some changes in the
lakeside ports, and will cause the removal of a certain number of
huts and embanking of a few cultivated areas, for which compensation will be paid. 8 '
Uganda was to benefit from the dam in that it would produce 200
meters of head capable of producing hydroelectric power up to
15,000 kilowatts.8 2
With this background in mind, we will consider the agreements
leading to the construction of the dam. Negotiated by Britain, acting
for Uganda, and by Egypt through an exchange of Notes between the
two governments, it was done in three forms: first, an agreement regarding the construction of the dam, 8 3 pure and simple; second, an
agreement on the granting of a contract for construction of the
dam; 8 4 and third, an agreement on financial arrangements for con85
struction and maintenance of the dam.
The first of the three agreements is the core of the formal treaty.
The first Note, written on May 30, 1949, was by the British Ambassador at Cairo to the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 8 6 It reflected completed negotiations, and that the agreements were in accordance with the spirit of the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929. The
purpose was twofold: to control the flow of the waters of the Nile
and to produce hydroelectric power for Uganda. It stated further
that even though the Uganda Electricity Board would invite tenders
and place contracts for construction, specifications for the work had
been prepared in full consultation and with approval of both Egyptian and Ugandan authorities. 87 The flow, which is a total of what
79.
Works,
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Hurst, The Lake Plateau Basin of the Nile, 17 (1925) (Egyptian Ministry of Public
Physical Dept. Paper No. 21) [hereinafter Hurst].
HURST, supra note 77, at 301.
Id. at 302.
Id.
U.N.Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 108-09.
Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 114-15.
Id. at 108-109.
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 111.
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goes through the turbines and what is allowed through the sluices,
was to be supervised by Egyptian engineers resident at Jinja. Paragraph 4 of the British Note stipulated:
The two governments have also agreed that though the construction
of the dam will be the responsibility of the Uganda Electricity Board,
the interests of Egypt will, during the period of construction, be represented at the site by the Egyptian resident engineer of suitable
rank and his staff stationed there for the purpose by the Royal Egyptian Government, to whom all facilities will be given for the accomplishment of their duties. Furthermore, the two Governments have
agreed that although the dam when constructed will be administered
and maintainedby the UgandaElectricity Board, the latter will regulate the discharges to be passed through the dam on the Instructions
of the Egyptian resident engineer to be stationed with his staff at the
dam by the Royal Egyptian Government for this purpose in accordance with arrangements to be agreed between the Egyptian Ministry
of Public Works and the Ugandan authorities pursuant to the provisions of agreements to be concluded between the two Governments
(emphasis added).8 8

Informal sources indicate there is still an Egyptian resident engineer
at the Owen Falls Dam, so it would appear that the agreement continues in force according to these terms. The British Note provided
that the Uganda Electricity Board could take any action it considered
desirable before or after construction of the dam, provided such measures were taken only after consultation and agreement with the Egyptian government. Any dispute which could not be resolved by negotiation or conciliation would be referred to arbitration.8 9
The reply from the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 90 dated
May 31, 1949, confirmed the formal agreement and it came into force
that day. That formal agreement provided for Ugandan authorities to
grant the contract for construction of the dam, with the approval of
the Egyptian Government, and that constituted the second agreement. 9 '
The final round of the Owen Falls Agreement concerned financial
arrangements for construction. The first Note, dated July 16, 1952,
was from the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British
Charge d'Affaires at Cairo. 9 2 Laying emphasis on the value of Lake
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 114-15.
91. See text of both letters in U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at

108-09.
92. Id. at 110-111.
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Victoria as storage of water for Egypt, the carefully worded Note
read:
The Royal Egyptian Government
(i) Will bear that part of the cost of the dam at Owen Falls which is
necessitated by the raising of the level of
Lake Victoria by the
93
use of Lake Victoria for storage of water.
The ordinary meaning of this provision suggests that the engineers
who designed the dam anticipated that as a result of construction,
the level of Lake Victoria would rise because the very nature of the
storage function of the dam would cause back-water effect, depending on how closely the dam would be built to the natural lake. Construction of the dam and the storage function would affect the
natural outflow from the lake temporarily or permanently. The
agreement took care of the effect of the rising level of the lake. Egypt
undertook to compensate those around Lake Victoria who might be
affected by the change in water level in the lake. The second paragraph of the Note said that the Royal Egyptian Government:
(ii) Will bear the cost of compensation in respect of interests affected by the implementation of the scheme or, in the alternative, the cost of creating conditions which shall afford equivalent

facilities and amenities to those at present enjoyed by the organizations and persons affected, and the cost of works of reinstatement as are necessary to ensure a continuance of the conditions obtaining before the scheme comes into operation, such
costs to be calculated in accordance with the arrangements
agreed between our two Governments. 94

The Note suggested further that the flow of water through the dam
would be controlled for purposes other than hydroelectric power
generation, noting that on occasion the flow control could be detrimental to electricity supply to Uganda. 9 s The Egyptian government
agreed "to pay to the Uganda Electricity Board the sum of £980,000
as compensation for the consequential loss of hydroelectric power,
such payment to be made on the date when power for commercial
sale is first generated at the Owen Falls Dam. 96 Egypt went further
and stipulated the conditions resulting from the rising level of the
lake as its responsibility. 97 Thus, the Egyptian government agreed
that for purposes of calculation of compensation under the provisions
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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of sub-paragraph (ii), all flooding around Lake Victoria within the
agreed range of three meters shall be deemed due to the implementation of the scheme.
In his response of January 5, 1953, 9" the British Ambassador concurred in the obligation undertaken by Egypt, and the Owen Falls
Dam was commissioned in 1954. The regime worked well if it provided Uganda with the hydroelectric power it needed, and if the stor-

age function continued to Egypt's satisfaction. The agreement may be
assumed to be binding upon Uganda whatever the change of government, so long as Uganda continued to enjoy the power supply, pro-

vided that there was no new agreement and neither party renounced
this agreement. 99
Egypt incurred further obligations vis-a-vis the other two riparians
of the lake, Kenya and Tanzania. In the event of any physical or environmental change suffered resulting from rising levels of the lake,
Egypt would pay compensation.'
The binding force of that obliga-

tion seems to remain, even though Kenya and Tanzania have secured
their independence. That Kenya and Tanzania, after their independence, may not have acceded to the Owen Falls Agreement, is not of
any legal consequence as regards the obligation Egypt undertook toward them. It seems, therefore, that under the Owen Falls Agreement, Egypt and Uganda might be under obligation to compensate
Kenya and Tanzania if the latter states suffer environmental or phy-

sical injuries caused by operation of the Dam.' 0 ' The law of treaties
requires, further, that should Egypt and Uganda decide to modify or

revoke the stipulations relating to their third party rights, they are
under obligation to seek concurrence of Kenya and Tanzania.

02

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id., Paragraph (ii) of the letter from the Royal Egyptian Government.
101. The general rule of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt is expressed in Article 34
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). Treaties are generally binding only
among parties, and do not impose obligations on third parties, but may include third party
beneficiary provisions. This age-old practice has been outlined in Article 36 as follows:
(1) A right arises for a third state from a provision of a treaty if the parties to
the treaty intended the provision to accord that right either to the third state
or to a group of states to which it belongs, or to all states, and the third state
assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated unless the treaty otherwise provides.
An identical text with commentary detailing the background to the provision is in Official
Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties: First and Second Session,
Vienna, 1969, Art. 32 at 47-49, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/39I11IAdd 2 (1971).
102. See id. at 49-50 for background to the law of treaty requirement that "when a
right has arisen for a third State in conformity with Article 32, the right may not be revoked
or modified by the parties if it is established that the right was intended not to be revokable
or subject to modification without the consent of the third States." But see discussions on
the fluctuations in the level of Lake Victoria, Section III.
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During the negotiations for the agreement on the Owen Falls Dam,
the Egyptian government must have seen a need for research, observation, and recording of meteorological and hydrological data from
the basin of East African lakes, including Lake Victoria. This was the
subject of another agreement, done by exchange of Notes between
the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Ambassador
in Cairo (for
Uganda), before the Owen Falls Dam agreement was
10 3
completed.
The substance of this agreement was contained in the Egyptian
Note to the British Ambassador on January 19, 1950104 and it indicated the degree of cooperation which Ugandan authorities had
promised to Egypt because the data would help Egypt determine the
amount of water it could receive from these upper reaches of the
Nile. Ugandan authorities agreed to establish data collection posts,
marked on an enclosed map, in a number that would not be varied
without prior consultation. Further, the resident Egyptian engineer
at Owen Falls Dam and his assistants would have access to all the
posts situated in Uganda. The intention was that they would carry
out periodic inspections of the posts "to assure . . . the posts are

being satisfactorily maintained and the observations regularly collected." '
Egypt would contribute toward the expenses incurred in
maintenance of the posts, within a certain monetary limit.1 6 The
project was a long range one; the British reply dated February 28,
1950,"07 confirmed Uganda's undertakings as outlined, and the
agreement entered into force on March 1st, 1950. Interestingly, this
agreement provided Egypt with hydrological and meteorological data
of the East African Lakes region well ahead of the countries within
that catchment area.
The 1959 Agreement for Full Utilization of the Nile Waters
This agreement, which ushered in a new era in the history of the
Nile basin, was signed by Egypt and Sudan at Cairo on November 8,
1959.1'

The preamble stated that the 1929 Agreement had "only

regulated a partial use of the natural river and did not cover the
future conditions of a fully controlled river supply."' 0 9 To utilize
103. As noted above, the last stage in the exchange of Notes constituting the Agreement
came on January 5, 1953. See text of both letters in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963),
supra note 3, at 108-09.
104. Text in U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 112-13.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 143-48.
109. Id.
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the Nile waters for the benefit of the two republics required the implementation of projects for full control of the river, an increase of
its water supply, and the planning of new working arrangements "on
lines different from those followed under the present conditions."' 1 0
To refer to "full utilization" and "full control of the river" when
there were only two states involved in the agreement rather than all
of the basin states, especially the upper ones, seems rather anomalous.
There is no evidence that Ethiopia, which contributes about 85% of
the gross annual flow at Khartoum, or the East African States, were
invited to any of the negotiations. The two parties to the agreement
were both simply recipients and users, dependent on water from central Africa and Ethiopia. They needed the cooperation of those upper
basin States if their goal was to be realized. In declaring that the new
agreement was not only more comprehensive, but also different in
spirit from preceding ones, especially the 1929 agreement, they were
beginning nearly with tabula rosa as far as the utilization and control
of Nile waters was concerned and with regard to treaties between
their states.
Substantively, the parties began by defining "established rights" to
be the quantities of waters used by either party before the control
works established by the Agreement-for Egypt, 48 milliard cubic
meters, and for Sudan, 4 milliard cubic meters per year, measured at
Aswan."'
The basis on which the respective volumes of water were determined is not clear from the text. These two states negotiated and
agreed on the proportions for their respective rights; ordinarily, it
would be assumed that they considered what would be equitable and
reasonable under the circumstances as analyzed earlier. Bard'12
looked at the relative figures for Egypt and Sudan and concluded
that:
A state is at liberty to accept less than is due to it, should it so decide, for considerations of policy of which it is the judge. But the
exercise of such a liberty in an international treaty . . . makes it
inadvisable to draw legal conclusions from such an instrument or to
consider it a precedent in international law.
Thus, he opined that there was really no historical or legal basis for
the proportions set aside for Egypt and Sudan in this agreement.' '3
110.
111.
112.
113.
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The control works under the Agreement were outlined in Section
II of the document.' 1 Perhaps the most important was the provision
for the construction of Sudd el Aali, or the High Dam, at Aswan, to
store water for Egypt and to prevent the flow of excess volumes of
water to the sea, which Egypt would consider a waste. At the same
time, the dam would cause back water flooding of the territory of
the Sudan, particularly the town of Wadi Halfa. Under paragraph 6
of Section II, Egypt agreed to pay LE. 15 million to Sudan as full
compensation for damages to Sudanese property that might be caused
by the storage of water at the Sudd el Aali Reservoir. Details of such
compensation were outlined in Annex II to the Agreement. 1" Sudan
also undertook to transfer its population whose property was to be
affected by the storage effect of Aswan from Halfa and surrounding
areas prior to July 1963.
The Agreement provided that Sudan would construct Rosieres
Reservoir on the Blue Nile and any other works deemed necessary to
enable Sudan to exploit its share of the water. 1 '6 This was a major
concession to Sudan because, during the negotiations leading to the
1929 agreement, Egypt had strongly opposed such works in the
Sudan. At that time Egypt had been concerned over possible Sudanese intentions because in 1924 Britain had threatened to increase irrigation consumption of water in Sudan.'17 The political atmosphere in
1959 was different. Also, perhaps, the changed position was because
Sudan had undertaken not to exceed the volume stipulated in the
1929 Agreement. It is noteworthy, however, that even though the
two states could agree on construction of the Rosieres Reservoir on
the Blue Nile, they failed to involve Ethiopia as aparty to the treaty
in order to assure themselves of the volume of water from Ethiopia.
The same disregard extended to the states of the Upper Nile Basin;
this is seen clearly in Section III of the Agreement which emphasized
the loss of water through evaporation in the Sudds of Sudan." 1 The
Sudan government agreed to increase the supply of water flowing
down the Nile, and to drain the swamps. Central to this pair of commitments was the Jonglei Canal Project which would run from the
village of Jonglei in the south to Malakal in the north.' 19 Presumably,
this would, through reclamation, open up more agricultural land in
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 143-48.
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Sudan. The two countries agreed to share the cost of the construction, as well as the water released from the swamp. 20
Anticipated projects for the use of the Nile waters under the Agreement were to be backed by a system of technical cooperation between
the two parties. Thus, they agreed in Section IV to constitute a Permanent Joint Technical Committee, composed of an equal number
of members from each republic, to be responsible for: supervision of
all working arrangements in the Agreement; carrying out necessary
hydrological studies to facilitate adequate policies; and preparation
of work implemented in territories outside Sudan by agreement with
their concerned authorities.' 21
Paragraph (i) of Section V commits the two parties to a common
front in any negotiations with third party states. It reads:
in case any question connected with the Nile waters needs negotiations with the governments of any riparian territories outside the
Republic of Sudan and the United Arab Republic the two Republics
shall agree beforehand on a unified view in accordance with the investigations of the problem by the Committee. This unified view
shall then form the basis of instructions to be followed by the Committee in the negotiations with the governments concerned. 22
At the time of this agreement, there was a nine year old agreement
between Egypt and Britain (for Sudan) for hydrological study of the
basins of the central African lakes.' 23 Therefore, in terms of basic
hydrological data on the Nile and Lake Victoria basins, the two states
were evidently ahead of the other basin states. The advantages, in
event of any negotiations anticipated in this agreement, would be
enormous for Egypt and Sudan.
The Protocol Concerning the PermanentJoint Technical Commission
Section IV(3) of the 1959 Agreement required the parties to form a
technical Committee to fulfill the functions already analyzed above. 24
Four members were appointed to each party. That purpose was met
by a Protocol signed by the two states at Cairo in January 1960121
which was to be an integral part of the Agreement. There was a stipulation in the Protocol that should there be a need to alter any aspect
120. Article V of the 1959 Agreement;see U.N. DOC. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra
note 3, at 143, 145.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 144.
125. Id. at 148-49.
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of it, then 1 that would be done by exchange of letters between the
two parties. 26
Agreement for the HydrometeorologicalSurvey of Lake Victoria,
Kyoga, and Albert (Mobuto Sese Seko)
A plan of operation for hydrometeorological surveys of the above
area was signed by five countries: Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania,
and Uganda, as well as the United Nations Development Programs
(UNDP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the
Project declared operational from 17 August, 1967.127 Its purpose

was to evaluate the water balance of the Lake Victoria catchment in
regard to control and regulation of the lake level as well as the flow
of water down the Nile. 1 28 Funding for the project was to come from
UNDP, while WMO was the executing agency; hence their agreement
with the countries territorial in the area of operation and/or interested in the results of the study.
As background preceding the 1967 Agreement, Egypt and Britain
had signed an Agreement for cooperation in meteorological and hydrological surveys of the Lake Victoria catchment by an exchange of
Notes in 1950.129 Following that, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda set

up an East African Nile Waters Coordinating Committee to establish
and maintain "a common East African case and a point of view on the
Nile waters,"' 30 which may be perceived as a British attempt to create
a kind of counterpart of the framework of the 1950 Agreement. Theoretically, the Committee was to consist of the three Ministers concerned but in fact the Ministers never met as a Committee. Instead, the
participants were technical and administrative officers. On a few occasions, members of this Committee, and members of the Permanent
Joint Technical Committee of the Nile (Egypt and Sudan) held consultative meetings to discuss such matters as control of discharge at
Owen Falls Dam, the future storage of waters in Lakes Victoria and
Albert, and irrigation requirements of the East Africa countries in
By 1960, the Coordinating Committee had,
the lake drainage area.'
after preliminary discussions, endorsed the need for a survey of the
hydrometeorology of the catchment area of Lake Victoria.'32 In
126. Id. at 112-13.
127. Hydrometeorological Survey, supra note 10, Vol. 1, Part 1, at 9.
128. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), supra note 3, at 144.
129. Id. at 112-13.
130. SEATON & MALITI, supra note 64, at 91; Fahmy, InternationalAspects of the
River Nile (conference paper), U.N. Doc. E/CONF/TP 22 (Jan. 15, 1977, at 8) [hereinafter
Fahmy].
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19611 33 the three East African governments requested the UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for aid to conduct a preliminary hydrometeorological survey of that catchment. In response,
a team of three consultants from WMO and FAO took a preliminary
survey in early 1962, and submitted a report to the three governments
in 1963.134
A discussion of that report convinced the three governments that
the survey should be extended to include Lakes Kyoga and Albert
catchments, and that they should include Egypt and Sudan as participants. A review of the proposal by consultants financed by the UN
special fund in 1965 approved the project and Egypt and Sudan were
invited as participants in the hydrometeorological survey.1 35 At a
meeting in Nairobi in August 1965, the representatives of the five
countries formulated a project proposal and submitted it1to
the Spe36
cial Fund. It later was adopted by the UNDP for funding.
That is the background of the 1967 Agreement. As the project
progressed, the five participants had consultations with Rwanda and
Burundi to extend the project area to cover the Lake Victoria catchment in Rwanda and Burundi, as well.' 3' Thus, the total catchment
area under the project is 378,000 square kilometers, of which approximately 325,000 square kilometers is in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda,
38
and about 53,000 square kilometers in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire
The Agreement for the Establishment of the Organizationfor
Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin
Little has been published to date on the work or planned projects
under the Kagera Basin Agreement; thus far, two major projects have
been reported. One is the construction of a Tanzanian sugar project,
costing an estimated 69 million.' 3 9 It was anticipated that the project
would begin operation in 1980 with a daily output of 250 tons of
sugar, and that it would be financed by the governments of India and
the Netherlands, two Indian commercial banks, the AbuDhabi Fund
for Arab Economic Development, and the Tanzanian government.' 4 o
The second project was construction of a dam at Rusumo Falls, for
hydro-electric power. 4 ' Feasibility studies completed in 1979 esti133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Fahmy, supra note 130.
Id.
Id.
Hydrometeorological Survey, supra note 10.
Fahmy, supra note 130, at 7 and 13.
The Standard (Nairobi), October 17, 1978, at 8.
Id.
Sunday News (Dar es Salaam), January 20, 1980.
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mated the project would produce 100 megawatts of electricity.42
Final decision on the project, including the height of the dam, was
made at a meeting of the Kagera River Development Commission at
Kigali in January 1980.'
The Agreement for establishment of the Organization for Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin was signed by Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania in 1977.144 Although this Agreement
was signed by only these three countries, it provided in Article 19
that the "agreement is open to accession by Uganda" at any time. 45
Operation of the Agreement was to be within the framework of the
Organization suggested in the title and established under Article 1.
Article 3 of the Agreement provides:
The territorial jurisdiction of the Organization is drained by the
Kagera River and its tributaries and subtributaries . . .
Provided that the Governments may, by mutual agreement, assign to
the Organization other geographical areas in order to facilitate or
make possible the full and proper study of and comprehensive planning for the implementation of the projects, works, and programmes
entailed in the harmonious development of 1the Basin, or where services are to be provided to or from the Basin. 46
But the terms of the agreement include almost all the sectors of
development one could imagine. Since this is a new agreement, we
shall quote Article 2 here:
The objective of the Organization is to deal with all questions relative
to the activities to be carried out in the Kagera River Basin, notably:
(a) Water and hydropower development;
(b) The furnishing of water and water-related services for mining
and industrial operations, potable water supplied for other
needs;
(c) Agriculture and livestock development, forestry, and land reclamation;
(d) Mineral exploration and exploitation;
(e) Disease and pest control;
(f) Transport and communications;
(g) Trade;
(h) Tourism;
(i) Wildlife conservation and development;
(j) Fisheries and aquacultural development;
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
U.N.T.S.
Id.
Id.
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(k) Industrial development including fertilizer production, exploration and exploitation of peat;
1
(1) Environmental protection. 47
Most projects are expected to be national in the sense of operating
exclusively within one national jurisdiction, but Article 2 adds further that:
A project, work or programme shall be considered of an Inter-state
nature in terms of this article when:
1. it involves the territory of more than one of the member states;
2. the services or benefits to be derived may be transmitted through,
or received entirely or partially in, the territory of member states
or state, other than that of the state where the project, work, or
programme is to be undertaken;

3. it is likely, in the judgment of the Organization, to produce substantial effects, whether these be beneficial or prejudicial, in the
territory of a State or States, different from that of the State
where the project, work, or programme is to be undertaken. 1 41
It seems, then, that a project may be considered interstate even
when one of the states involved is not party to the agreement.
This agreement is one that is truly geared toward development in
the drainage basin, rather than simply a regulatory one. But Article 7
gives the Commission regulatory powers including assessing and,
where appropriate, approving project proposals. 49 Prior to consideration by the Commission, the project proposals are assessed and compiled by the Secretariat, assisted by the departments of Research &
Statistics; Projects, Planning & Execution; and Management & Administration. The administrative budget is contributed by members in the
proportions of 25% for Burundi, 35% for Rwanda, and 40% for Tanzania."' However, provisions as to the sources of the development
budget are not absolutely clear. Article 7 (b) states:
In the name of the Organization to submit requests to, and sign
agreements and assume obligations with international institutions regional or otherwise, and other governments for technical assistance
and financing . . ."'

suggesting miscellaneous donor sources. Member states also may request technical assistance and finance from the Organization; as stip147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ulated in Article II, these shall be approved by the Commission.1s2
In retrospect, not until after World War II were important agreements reached on utilization of the Nile. Even then, the 1925 Agreement was an unusual one, certainly void in relation to Ethiopia both
then and now. The first full-scale agreement on the Nile came in 1929.
Again, the background of that treaty was so riddled with political
complications that evidently it was a temporary agreement, nonetheless assuring Egypt of its water needs being met. A more stable treaty
was signed in 1959, between Egypt and Sudan, which remains in force
between the two parties.
Remaining in force as well is the Owen Falls Agreement signed between Egypt and Britain (on behalf of Uganda). The obligation seems
to have fallen on Uganda by virtue of its continued use of hydroelectric power from the dam, and because it has not renounced the treaty
responsible for the generation of that power. Egypt is interested in
the storage value of the dam and Lake Victoria. Because of that continued force of the treaty, it appears that Kenya and Tanzania retain
the third state rights extended to them in event of injuries resulting
from the rising level of the lake. Under the treaties examined here,
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania do not seem under any obligation regarding the use of the waters flowing to the Lake Victoria and Nile
Basins. At least there has been no agreement on the utilization of the
waters of Lake Victoria directly involving all of the riparian states.
Tanzania clearly rejected the 1929 Agreement, and Kenya's position
seems moot as well. Similarly, we have not seen a treaty imposing any
obligations on Zaire, Rwanda, or Burundi, although they are basin
states. However, all of these may be under limited obligations under
general international law to permit the lower riparian states an equitable share of the water, the exact modalities being subject to fresh
negotiation.
III. POST 1959 AGREEMENT DEVELOPMENTS
Since the signing in 1959 of the last agreement on the Nile Basin
with any relevance to the Victoria catchment area, and the supporting Protocol in 1960, several unpublicized policy actions have been
taken and implemented by the basin states. Some have involved consumptive uses of the waters to an extent that would affect the hydrological and meteorological regime of the Lake Victoria and Nile drainage basin. Such policy measures might necessitate consideration of a
legal regime beyond that analyzed above. Some of those policy state152. Id.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

ments and measures are outlined briefly here, with no order of priority to be inferred.
Egypt
Itmay be assumed that the regular rise inpopulation in Egypt
would raise the country's needs for irrigation for food-production beyond what was needed in 1959. Egypt probably has agreed with
Sudan on quantities of water for their respective uses. There are, however, two considerations that might dramatically increase Egypt's
need for water.
In December 1975, Egypt opened six pipelines to carry water
across the Suez Canal to the Sinai desert for irrigation.! 53 The project
was supposed to commence with irrigation of some 5,000 acres, to be
increased later to provide 10,000 refugee families from the Gaza Strip
with livelihood, but was never implemented by the United National
agency.'
Additionally, it is understood that Egypt has hydrologists studying
the possibility of piping "the Nile waters to Jerusalem for Jewish,
Christian, and Moslem pilgrims visiting the holy places."' 5 This extension would add 240 miles to the length of the Nile, and is further
evidence of Egypt's increasing need for water. From the legal point
of view, there may be a question of whether Jerusalem and the Sinai
desert are properly within the Nile catchment area and, if not, then
there may be a question of whether it requires consideration by the
basin states.
At the general level there have been press speculations about reactions in Egypt to possible control of Uganda by unfriendly governments.'1 6 The speculations point to the fact that Egypt continues to
be fairly nervous about the political regimes in the upper Nile basin
states that might affect the security of its water supply. It is the belief of this writer that Egypt can benefit only through persuasion and
diplomacy, and that it would lose an open or hostile struggle regarding these waters.
153. See The New York Times, Dec. 14, 1975, at 28; and some comments in Batstone,
supra note 16, at 554.
154. Id.
155. The Nairobi Times, Dec. 16, 1979.
156. The Weekly Review (Nairobi), April 27, 1979, at 21, remarks that Egypt went a
long way in giving military aid to the armed forces during the liberation of Uganda in April
1979. The hypothesis developed was that, all old animosities aside, Egypt believed that any
of Amin's resistance forces backed by Libya with support of the Soviet Union might put
Egyptian interests in jeopardy, given Egypt's animosity toward Russia. This may be so, but
the theory does not address the previously publicized reports that the Arab states supported
Amin's regime through the eight years of reprehensible misrule.
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Sudan
Sudan has undertaken a major project"5 7 in the Jonglei Canal
which consists, essentially, of draining the Sudd area of southern
Sudan between Jonglei and Malakal. It is, therefore, entirely within
Sudanese territory, but of major significance to Egypt because more
water will flow to Egypt. The hope is that this will stop the loss of
water through evaporation over the Sudd, open up more area in
southern Sudan for agriculture, and release more water for irrigation
in northern Sudan and Egypt.
The idea is an old one, and has been a subject of engineering and
ecological studies.' 58 However, in the past few years its merits have
been subject to controversy, largely initiated by hypotheses that the
project would be an ecological catastrophe." 9 Most commentators
condemn the project for the social and environmental problems it
will cause Sudan. 1 60 However, there are also some hypotheses about
the kinds of trans-territorial environmental problems envisaged, although these are still only speculative, because none of them purports
to know exactly what is happening. However, they do point to
reasons why there should be broad, international interest in the project. First, there is the hypothesis that draining the Sudd will change
the weather, including rainfall patterns, in the entire region surrounding southern Sudan. 16 1 This is postulated on the proposition that the
heavy evaporation from the Sudd contributes to rainfall in the region,
and may or may not actually occur. There has been no response from
Sudan to give contrary information. However, if the hypothesis were
to be verified by actual changes later on, then the neighboring states
could argue that Sudan is liable for trans-territorial environmental injuries under general international law. Secondly, it has been hypothesized that the combined volume of water (20 million cubic meters)
flowing down the Jonglei Canal and the regular flow of the Sobat
River would change the rate of flow of the Sobat as the river ap-

157. Sudan's official reports of the Jonglei Canal Project (publication pending). However, a number of critical commentaries on the project and its possible effects are available.
See AFRICAN BUSINESS Nov. 14-16,1978; MANN, supra note 119.
158. See especially the five volume study THE EQUATORIAL NILE PROJECT AND
ITS EFFECTS IN THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN: BEING THE REPORT OF THE
JONGLEI INVESTIGATION TEAM (1954).
159. The Weekly Review, March 9, 1979, at 26-27; May 5, 1978, at 2; May 12, 1978, at
2; April 28, 1978, at 24; AFRICAN BUSINESS 14-16 (Nov. 1978); EARTHSCAN BRIEFING Doc. No. 8; MANN, supra note 119.
160. See supra note 157.
161. The Weekly Review 26-27, March 9, 1979, at 26-27; EARTHSCAN BRIEFING
Doc. No. 8.
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proaches Malakal, causing flooding of the Sobat Valley in Ethio1
pia. 62
A report written for the Nairobi-based Environmental Liaison Center by Oscar Mann states:
A "backwater" effect manifests itself as damming-up of one river
caused by a powerful flow across it from another river, as at the
junction of two rivers. In this case, the large volume of water flowing
into the River Sobat from the tail of the Canal may cause this river
to rise and accentuate the flood hazards upstream. The combined
canal water and Sobat flow may cause a backwater effect on the Nile
1
increasing flooding on the Ghazal, Jebel, and Zeraf river systems. 63
Again, the probability of this threat remains uncertain. If it were
to happen, it might precipitate an international crisis between Sudan
and the injured state(s), or the affected state(s) simply might bring
legal action against Sudan.
The third hypothesis 1 64 arises from the foregoing. It suggests that,
in an effort to reduce the threat of flooding, the cooperation of
Uganda be sought to further control out-flow at Owen Falls Dam.
Such action would promote the role of Lake Victoria as a storagehead in the interest of Egypt. The problem is that such control could
cause a backwater effect, raising the level of Lake Victoria, and causing physical and ecological injuries to the states riparian to the lake.
Some consequences of this set of problems are discussed in the section on Kenya. Very simply, they relate to whether the rising level of
Lake Victoria entitles Kenya and Tanzania to damages under the
Owen Falls agreement and general international law.
In each of the three instances, there would be international problems created which could pose serious threats to peace and good
neighborliness. Perhaps Sudan has revealed its studies countering
these hypotheses at the secret ministerial consultations which occur
annually, especially with Kenya, in order to avoid speculation about
Sudano-Egyptian irresponsibility in undertaking the project without
consultation with other states. Egypt and Sudan might be cited for
arrogance if they continue to fail to seek the cooperation of the
upper basin states for continued water supply.
Ethiopia
Ethiopian plans for use of the Blue Nile or Sobat waters for consumptive plans are not known to this author. However, there is evi162. MANN, supra note 119.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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dence that Ethiopia was considering increased utilization of the Nile
to an extent which Egypt found threatening to its interests.1 6
Reports on the issue are sketchy. According to an Egyptian newspaper,
Egypt and the Sudan were studying with great interest feasibility

studies being conducted by the USSR around Lake Tsana, where
about 85% of the Nile water originates. Egypt will not allow the exploitation of the Nile waters for political goals, will not tolerate any
pressure being brought to bear on it, or the fomenting of disputes
between itself and its neighbours.' 66
The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a series of terse
and nonconciliatory responses directed largely to Egypt and in part
to Sudan. 6 7 Their position was that "Ethiopia has all the rights to
exploit her natural resources."' 6 8 Purportedly the statements also reminded Egypt that, even though it receives 85% of its Nile waters
from Ethiopia, it had never shown friendship nor sought cooperation
from Ethiopia but had shown hostility to independent Ethiopia in
every aspect of international existence. 6 9 The Ethiopian statement
points out that Egypt went ahead and built the Aswan Dam, which
was to depend on the Blue Nile waters, "without even consulting
Ethiopia."170 In the ultimate analysis, the situation illustrates a trend
which will develop if basin states do not consult one another and develop a framework for cooperative utilization of the waters of an international river. After the fact, it is almost impossible to establish a
framework of cooperation and, in an ensuing war, the lower riparians
are likely to be losers.
Tanzania
The Republic of Tanzania is understood to be planning two major
development projects utilizing the Lake Victoria Basin waters, one is
to use the waters of the Kagera River discussed above, and the other
to use the abstract of the waters of Lake Victoria itself for irrigation
of the Vembere steppes in central Tanzania, which is outlined below.
Tanzania may have considered more than one approach to the utilization of waters of Lake Victoria, but one that stands out in history
was narrated by H. E. Hurst from the Egyptian Ministry of Works
165. Akhbar El Yom (Cairo), May 13, 1978.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
See The Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa) of May 14, 21, and June 2, 1978.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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who went to Tanganyika in 1926 to ascertain if there was indeed such
a plan for irrigation. He recounts the plan as follows:
I found out that the Germans had, before the 1914-18 War, a project
to take water from Smith Sound, a long inlet at the south end of
Lake Victoria, over the low country which separates the lake from
the land sloping down towards Lake Eyassi. The water would have
been used to irrigate arid land on the Vembere Steppe for the growing of cotton. The scheme, which was not a government one, was to
start on a small scale with a dam at Manyonga River to store its flood
water and irrigate a small experimental area. From this pilot project
data would be obtained for a larger scheme, in which another dam
would be built on the Manyonga, and hydroelectric stations at the
dam would supply power to pump water from Lake Victoria. After
passing through the turbines the water 1 would
irrigate land lower
71
down and finally drain into Lake Egyassi.
The area planned for irrigation in this project was 230,000 hec-

tares, or 550,000 feddans. The extent to which this project has been
considered seriously in modern Tanzania is not known; in a recent

critical commentary, Professor Rene Dumont wrote:
The Smith Sound project, aiming to bring water at great cost from
Lake Victoria to the south, will probably be worth studying towards
the end of this century, to be finally carried out at the beginning of
the next century. For the moment, the whole of small and mediumscale irrigation certainly has priority, especially in the spirit of the
Arusha Declaration. I call attention to the Davidoff project from the
era of Stalin, aiming to take into Central Asia water from the great
Siberian rivers; it has been put off to a very distant date, very
wisely.1 72
As desert states that depend on the Nile waters, Egypt and Sudan
might have some problems with the Smith Sound project, depending
on the quantity of water to be extracted. At the time of his visit,
Hurst thought the estimate to be about 82 cubic meters of water per
second 1 7 or "90 tons a second could make no appreciable difference
to the Nile." 171
Kenya
The issue of first instance is that, although the level of Lake Victoria is known for several monthly and annual fluctuations, a special
171. HURST, THE NILE, supra note 77, at 156; and Hurst, supra note 79, at 6-10.
172. DUMONT, TANZANIA AGRICULTURE AFTER THE ARUSHA DECLARATION: A REPORT 48 (1969) (Dar es Salaam Ministry of Economic Affairs & Development
Planning).
173. Hurst, supra note 79, at 9.
174. HURST, supra note 77, at 156.
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trend began in 1961 and culminated in 1964 with a maximum rise of
two and one half meters. This is an unusual and unprecedented rise, 7 5
and the consequences in Kenya have been noticeable. There is loss
around the lake of large tracts of land which have been covered by
water. Most of that land had been used for small-scale agricultural activities. The breeding grounds of some species of fish were submerged
and the resulting change is viewed as a possible contributant to the
disappearance of some of the species, namely the tilapia esculenta
and protopterus. 76 The increased flooding and swamps around the
lake have provided breeding grounds for mosquitos,'1 7 creating a
special health problem. Finally, the raised level of the lake resulted in
the submergence of pier facilities at Kisumu, Kendu Bay, and Homa,
and Asembo Bay. Throughout the 1960s, temporary pierage facilities
had to be deployed at each location until the East African Railways
Corporation had the piers reconstructed in 1974.178 There may well
be similar consequences felt in Tanzania and Uganda which remain
unpublicized.
The theory' 7 9 that the control of outflow at Jinja is responsible
for the increased lake level is strengthened by the background information on the construction of the dam which was to make the lake
into a century storage head. As evidenced in the background to the
agreement discussed above, the dam was expected to produce an increase in the level of the lake to the margin projected. The agreement
itself allowed for such a rise, and the parties included provisions for
compensation to injured parties. Therefore, arguments that the dam
could not have caused the rise in the lake's level seem suspect and,
perhaps, misleading.'
175. Hydrometeorological Survey, supra note 10, at 744-53, and graph at 752.
176. Welcome, The Effects of Rapidly Changing Water Levels in Lake Victoria Upon
Commercial Catches of Tilapis (pisces Cichlidae) in MANMADE LAKES: THE ACCRA
SYMPOSIUM 242-49 (Obeng, Ed., 1969); KONGERE, PRODUCTION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF LAKE VICTORIA FISHERIES (Seminar Series on Lake Victoria No.
6, 1979); and ODERO, FISH SPECIES, DISTRIBUTION AND ABUNDANCE IN LAKE
VICTORIA (Seminar Series on Lake Victoria No. 11, 1979).
177. On June 22, 1973, Orinda Sibour, a Kenyan member of the East African Legislative Assembly, raised the issue at the Assembly and squarely blamed the control of the outlet at Owen Falls Dam for withholding too much water and causing the high level of the lake.
The Ugandan delegates denied that there was any causal relation between the Owen Falls
Dam outlet controls and the rising level of the lake but, at a resumed debate on the issue on
June 25, 1973, Joseph Hyerere of Tanzania joined Sibour in blaming the Owen Falls Dam
for the problems. The Ugandan representative maintained that the high level of the lake was
caused by heavy rainfall in 1961. A resolution was adopted calling on the three governments
to ascertain the cause of the problem and to find a speedy solution. See The East African
Standard (Nairobi) June 23, 1973, at 5 [hereinafter Sibour].
178. The author's personal acquaintance with the scene and the changes.
179. See Sibour, supra note 177.
180. Hon. James Osogo, Kenyan Minister of Health, submitted in parliamentary debate
that no experts had given him a satisfactory explanation as to the cause of the raised level

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

It seems that the last word on the problem has not been said, because the Hydrometeorological Survey team could give a more complete answer to the question. Then, should Kenya and Tanzania find
that report unsatisfactory, they could seek an agreement on a balanced formula for assessing the cause(s) of the unusual rise in the
level of Lake Victoria. Some general observers report that the level
has been rising since early 1978 and that the change already is noticeable at such popular spots as Hippo Point at Kisumu. 8 The Ministry
of Water Development is understood to be conducting studies to verify this state of affairs, and they may have their own explanation or a
better hypothesis.
The establishment of the Lake Victoria Basin Development Authority "8' 2 to spearhead comprehensive development in the catchment
area of Lake Victoria is a unique step. Through the working programs
of the Authority, Kenya might soon begin to consult with the other
two riparian states.
Program planning might be treacherous unless such problems as an
erratic rise in lake levels are eliminated. On the other hand, increased
use of the waters of the rivers before they reach the lake may have an
effect on lake levels. By the same token, if such utilization of water
can make a difference in the lake level, then it might also have impact
on the water flowing down the Nile. In this case, Egypt might want
to discuss with Kenya the seasonality and quantity of water to be
used on the Kenya side. This might be the case more particularly if
Tanzania also decided to carry out the Smith Sound Project, because
the combined impact of use by the major source of Lake Victoria
waters might make a vast difference in the water storage which Egypt
has always coveted.
There is also the question of fishery resources on the lake. Although
the popular view' 8 3 is that there has been very little migration of fish
in and out of Winam Gulf, conservation measures to maintain the
proper resources balance might still be necessary. Absence of large
scale migratory patterns by the lake fish species does not mean that
fish obey the territorial boundaries. The Nile perch have wandered
from the Nile into Lake Victoria and up to Winam of their own voliof the lake. He added, "I believe that the Jinja dam causes the water to rise and consequently
lakeshore residents are often subjected to floods." See The East African Standard (Nairobi),
July 8, 1976.
181. Personal conversations with residents of Kisumu, 1978.
182. Okoth-Ogendo, The State and the Individual in Land Use Policy: A Case Study of
Lake Victoria Basin Authority, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF LAKE VICTORIA BASIN OF KENYA 305-17 (C. 0. Okidi, ed. 1979) (Univ. of Nairobi
IDSL OP No. 34).
183. Kongere, supra note 6, at 407-13.
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tion."' Therefore, a modicum of consultative framework among the
three littoral states might be needed if the Authority is to have effective long-term control of fish as an important resource.
It has been mooted in Kenya that, given adequate technology,
Kenya should transfer the Lake Victoria catchment water to the arid
areas of the country for irrigation. 8 Perhaps the handiest scene for
that kind of experiment would be the Kerio Valley, for which a special development Authority has been established by the Kenya Parliament.' 86 The question of feasibility of such projects is an engineering
one which, some observers say, is within reach. 8 7 Such an undertaking
would use massive quantities of water if it were to be executed. In
large measure, the projects would be analogous to Tanzania's irrigation of the Vembere Steppes. It appears that Egypt would need to
change its traditional position and opt for an agreement on a hydrological regime for the entire Nile Basin.
General
Some general developents in the international scene have impact on
the use of internationally shared water resources. First, there are
changes in the general political economy. No group of states demonstrated better that national natural resources are a powerful political
weapon than the Arab States when they imposed an oil embargo
against friends of Israel. This brings into question the new international economic order wherein states are supposed to cooperate in
the management of resources to promote equitable development.' 88
Secondly, the range of demands on water resources is increasing,
and one of the most serious problems is that of pollution.' 8 9 As noted
earlier, conservation of the resources of Lake Victoria must be approached on a lake-wide basis because pollution will not respect territorial boundaries. Municipal and industrial effluents discharged into
184. KONGERE, PRODUCTION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF FISHERIES
IN THE LAKE VICTORIA BASIN 10-11 (Seminar Series on Lake Victoria Basin Development No. 6, 1979).
185. Daily Nation (Nairobi) March 16, 1978, at 3.
186. KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 59 (Act No. 9) August 31, 1979.
land in the Kenyan part of the Nile
187. One expert opinion has estimated that irrigable
6 3
basin is about 52,212 acres which require 296.85.10 m of water annually, but that there
6 3
might be additional areas that would require another 182.10 m of water per year. The extent to which Kenya has checked these estimates and/or taken the possibility seriously is
not publicly known. See Dekker, A Note on the Nile, WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH
VoL 8, No. 4, 818, 827 (Aug. 1972).
188. The U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the subject is No. 3281, adopted on
December 12, 1974, by roll-call vote of 120 for, 6 against, and 10 abstentions.
189. Kongere, supra note 6, at 408; The East African Standard (Nairobi), December 12,
1971, at 7; Daily Nation (Nairobi), April 12, 1979, at 5.
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one part of the lake in one of the three countries will have consequences for the other states.1 9 0
Third, the applicable law on internationally shared water resources
has been developing and is certainly more crystallized today than in
1960 when the last agreement on the Nile waters was signed.? 9 Therefore, it should be worthwhile for all of the basin states to take a fresh
look at the local regime and to begin working together on formulation of a regional practice meeting local exigencies of the time.
CONCLUSION
Conclusions have been drawn in each section; what seems clear
throughout is the desirability of a framework for consultation and
exchange of information on actual or intended projects involving utilization of the basin waters. One project to be accomplished within
the framework might be actual hydrological and meteorological
studies to ascertain basic or secondary facts and consequences of the
use of such waters.
What the countries decide to call that framework is immaterial, so
long as it involves all of the basin states and embraces the kinds of
issue areas that have been apparent in the above analyses. This writer
recommends urgently an agreement on a treaty creating a regulatory
framework, involving all the states of the Lake Victoria and Nile system. Such a framework would provide for the creation of development authorities to deal with development work for various parts of
the basin, the latter category to include the Kagera Commission, and
the Kenyan Lake Victoria Basin Development Authority. The disarray
noticeable in the present treaty situation should not be allowed to
continue.
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda need to remember that, pursuant to
the 1959 Agreement already discussed here, Sudan and Egypt have
undertaken to adopt a joint position in the event of any negotiations
with third states. These two countries are better equipped in terms of
hydrological and meteorological data, because they have worked at it
190. Thus, in 1973, V. M. Eyakuze of the then East African Medical Research Institute,
and his coleagues, called on the East African states to form a regional commission on water
pollution, to find mechanisms for preventing the continuing polution of Lake Victoria.
They observed that the lake's pollution was becoming "increasingly evident in the past few
years . . ." to the extent that it threatened some species of fish. Similar alarm had been
sounded by Kenyan authorities. Daily Nation (Nairobi), February 7, 1973; East African
Standard (Nairobi), December 12, 1971, at 7; Daily Nation, April 12, 1979, at 5.
191. See, e.g., the UNEP Governing Council Decision 6/4 on the "Draft Principles of
Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and
Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States" adopted on
May 19, 1978. U.N. GOAR, Supp. (No. 25) 154-55, U.N. Doc. A/33/25 (1978).
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since the 1950 agreement. They may be favored, also, in terms of access to the basic facts in the present hydrometeorological survey done
1
under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization. 92
There is very little advantage for the three East African countries in
terms of technical information, as compared to Egypt and Sudan.
The question is not one of renegotiation of the legal regime, but
one of "clean-slate" negotiation, because for the majority of the
states within the drainage system, there is no previously negotiated
agreement which binds them. It is better to agree on such a framework while there is a propitious atmosphere than after a conflict of
use has arisen among all or some of the basin states.

192. Hydrometeorological Survey, supra note 10.

